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REAL PROPERTY - RELATIVE PRIORITY OF LIENS -
FEDERAL TAX LIEN PRIORITY: A JUDICIAL
FRANKENSTEIN
By DWIGHT SHELLMAN
Dwight Shellman is a freshman in the University of Denver
College of Law.
In the recent case of United States v. Vorreiter,' the Colorado
Supreme Court added its voice to the growing chorus of state
and federal3 court dissatisfaction with the United States Supreme
Court's absolutism in according federal tax liens priority over all
types of state liens.
4
In the Vorreiter case, one Price, a resident of Texas, contracted
with Vorreiter, a Colorado resident, for the improvement of Price's
Colorado realty. Prior to the making of this contract, the Collector
of Internal Revenue in Austin, Texas, received assessment lists for
taxes owed by Price to the United States. The Internal Revenue
Code has long accorded the United States a general lien for unpaid
taxes.5 Under the 1939 code, which governed, the tax lien arose at
the time the Collector received the assessment list6 and attached to
all property of the taxpayer,7 but was invalid against "any mort-
gagee, pledgee, purchaser, or judgment creditor"8 unless recorded
in the office designated by state law. In the instant case, notice of
the federal lien was not filed in Colorado until after Vorreiter had
completed work under his contract and had filed a mechanics' lien
notice against Price's property. The Colorado statute9 grants the
mechanics' lien superiority over all prior and subsequent unrecord-
ed liens of which the mechanic's lien claimant has no notice.
In an action to foreclose the mechanics' lien, the Colorado Su-
preme Court found the subsequently arising but prior recorded me-
chanics' lien superior to the federal tax lien. The court reasoned:
(1) To give the federal tax lien priority would be to negate a set-
tled rule of Colorado property law, (2) The federal tax lien attaches
only to property owned by the taxpayer at the time the lien arises.
(3) To allow the Government to appropriate the inhanced value of
1307 P.2d 475 (Colo. 1957).
2E.g., United States v. Colotta, 79 So.2d 474 (Miss.), rev'd per curiam, 350 U. S. E08 (1955).
3 E. g., United States v. White Bear Brewing Co., 227 F.2d 359 (7th Cir. 1955), rev'd per curiam,
350 U. S. 1010 (1956).
1 For excellent treatments of this whole problem, see Reeve, The Relative Priority of Gov-
ernment and Private Liens, 29 Rocky Mtn. L. Rev. 167 (1957); Kennedy, The Relative Priority of the
Federal Government: The pernicious Career of the Inchoate and General Lien, 63 Yale L. J. 905 (1954).
SThe Internal Revenue Code of 1939. which governed the Vorreiter case, provided:
"§ 3670. Property subject to lien. If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses
to pay the some after demand, the amount . . . shall be a lien in favor of the United States
upon all property and rights thereto, whether real or personal, belonging to such person."
Cf. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6321.
a"§ 3671. Period of lien. ". . . (T)he lien shall arise at the tme the assessment list was re-
ceived by the collector and shall continue until the liability for such amount is satisfied or becomes
unenforceable by reason of lapse of time." Cf. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6322.
See note 6 supra.
8" § 3672. Validity against mortgagees, pledgees, purchasers and judgment creditors. (a) In'
validity of lien without notice. Such lien shall not be valid against any mortgcgee, pledgee, pur-
chaser or judgment creditor until notice has been filed by the collector...."
9 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 86.3-6 (1953).
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the taxpayers' property would be to confiscate the work and ma-
terials of the mechanics' lienor to pay the taxes of another, con-
trary to the doctrine of unjust enrichment. (4) Chief Justice Moore,
specially concurring, asserted that the federal statutory exception
protecting mortgagees, pledgees, purchasers and judgment creditors
without notice, should be broadened by interpretation to include
mechanics' lienors."
°
The result in the principal case directly contravenes the con-
struction the United States Supreme Court has given the tax lien
created by section 3670 of the 1939 code. As a review of its reason-
ing will demonstrate, the Colorado court pointedly omitted mention
of this long standing construction and the cases in which the United
States Supreme Court -established it.
(1) Settled Rule of Property. The cases cited by the Colorado
court to support its contention that the United States Supreme
Court will defer to state decisions which establish a settled rule of
property within that state, are clearly inapplicable." Indeed, United
States v. Snyder,12 the first Supreme Court decision to construe the
predecessor of section 3670,1" manifested no hesitation in invalidat-
ing a Louisiana recording statute which would have defeated the
federal lien as an unrecorded lien.' Moreover, the Constitution's
recitation of the federal power to tax,", when considered with the
supremacy clause,' seems decisive.
(2) Property Affected by the Tax Lien. The Colorado court's
theory that the federal lien attaches only to property owned by the
taxpayer when the lien arises is inconsistent with the Glass City
Bank case.'- There the United States Supreme Court held that the
federal tax lien applies to any property owned by a taxpayer at
any time during the life of the lien, although acquired after the lien
arises.
(3) Unjust Enrichment-Payment of Another's Taxes. The
Colorado court's contention that awarding the federal tax lien prior-
ity would unjustly enrich the United States, and, in effect, require
the mechanics' lienor to pay another's taxes, has great merit. The
Supreme Court, however, has consistently ignored this argument.
In point is the above mentioned Snyder case which involved a to-
bacco tax lien upon land. After the tax lien arose, the land was
conveyed to a good faith purchaser who had no notice of the lien.
When Snyder arose, the federal lien statute contained no provision
invalidating an unrecorded tax lien against "purchasers."'" The
question presented was whether the federal lien could be defeated
by a state recording statute. The answer, of course, was negative,
and the tax lien was foreclosed against the good faith purchaser.
10 307 P.2d at 479.
u The Colorado court cited Edward Hines Yellow Pine Trustees v. Martin, 268 U. S. 458 (1925);
Warburton v. White, 176 U. S. 484 (1899) and Burcher v. Cheshire R. Co., 125 U. S 555 (1888), none
of which concerned matters of taxation or lien priorities.
12 149 U. S. 210 (1893).
13 Rev. Stat. § 3186 (1878), as amended, 20 Stat. 327, 331 (1879).
L .o. Const. art. 176 (1879).
'5 U. S. Const. art. I, § 8, subs. 1; U. S. Const. amend. XVI.
16 U. S. Const. art. VI, § 2.
17 Glass City Bank v. United States, 326 U. S. 265 (1945).
"s20 Stat. 327, 331 (1879), amended, 37 Stat. 1016 (1913), (lien made invalid without notice
against mortgagees, purchasers or judgment creditors), amended, 45 Stat. 875 (1928) (added pledgees
to those protected from unrecorded lien).
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Following this severe precedent, the Supreme Court has frequently
applied the theory that the federal tax lien statute creates a secret,
general lien"9 valid, without regard to notice, against all subsequent
lienors who cannot bring themselves within the enumerated excep-
tions.20 Moreover, where it has appeared that a state lien was first
in time to the federal tax lien, the Court has gone to great lengths
to find an "imperfection" in the state lien sufficient to defeat its
priority.2 Although in the Vorreiter case, the Colorado mechanics'
lien did not even enjoy the dubious distinction of being first in
time, the cases establishing the doctrine of "perfection" illustrate
the Court's historic indifference to these arguments advanced by
the Colorado court in favor of Vorreiter's lien.
(4) Lienor as Mortgagee, Pledgee, Purchaser and Judgment
Creditor. Although the terms "mortgagee" and "pledgee" are ob-
viously inapplicable, various attempts have been made to fit state
lienors into the categories of "purchaser" and "judgment creditor."
Nevertheless, by Supreme Court definition, a purchaser is one who
acquires title or possession, in the manner of vendor and vendee,
for a valuable consideration,'2 while a judgment creditor is one who
has received a judgment from a court of record.
2
3
The Vorreiter case represents a state court's justifiable exas-
peration with the inequities inherent in the United States Supreme
Court's unrealistic and severe interpretation of the federal tax lien
law. To understand how the Supreme Court's interpretation has dis-
torted the language of section 3670, it is necessary to consider an-
other federal statute, section 3466 of the Revised Statutes.24 Section
3466 grants the United States first priority for debts due it from an
insolvent. The priority attaches when the debtor's property passes
to a third person (other than a trustee in bankruptcy) for distribu-
tion to creditors. Section 3466 creates no lien. It merely bestows a
priority to inusre that any debts due the United States will first be
satisfied.2'
'0 Mr. Justice Jackson's concurring opinion in United States v. Security Trust & Savings Bank-
340 U. S. 47, 51 (1950), traced the history of the § 3670 lien and approved the contention thc-t it
created a secret general lien.
SMackenzie v. United States, 109 F.2d 540 (9th Cir. 1940).
"1 United States v. Liverpool & L.&G. Ins. Co., 348 U. S. 215 (1955) (garnishment lien sunerserfed
by a subsequently arising tax lien that was recorded before judgment); United States v. Acri. 343
U. S. 211 (1955) (state lien contingent upon outcome of wrongful death action); United Stvtes v.
Gilbert Associates, Inc., 345 U. S. 361 (1953) (prior city tax lein); United St'e, v. Security Trust &
Savings Bank, 340 U. S. 47 (1950); New York v. Maclay, 288 U. S. 290 (1933) (prior unliquidated
state franchise taxes).
, United States v. Scovil, 348 U. S. 218, 221 (1955); and see United States v. Kings County Iron
Works, 224 F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1955).
United States v. Gilbert Associates, Inc., 345 U. S. 361 (1953).
24 Rev. Stat. § 3466 (1875), 31 U. S. C. § 191 (1952).
' Massachusetts v. United States, 333 U. S. 611 (1948). The lower federal courts have held that
neither § 3466 nor § § 3670-2 apply to proceedings in bankruptcy, reasoning that to so cpply them
would upset the scheme of distribution set out in the Bankruptcy Act. See United States v. Samp.ell,
153 F.2d 731 (9th Cir. 1946), and cases cited there. Re Taylorcraft Aviation Corp., 163 F.2d 808 (6th
Cir. 1948), appears to fall within this classification, but was cited by the Colorado court to support its
unjust enrichment argument in Vorreiter. 307 P.2d at 478.
SACHS-AULOR CORPORITIOH SEALS- ALPINE 5-3422
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Early cases construing section 3466 apparently gave no credence
to the theory that it created an absolute preference in favor of the
United States to override antecedent liens. 26 However the twentieth
century saw a growing tendency on the part of the Supreme Court
to require that a state lien be "perfected" before it could compete
with the federal priority for the funds of an insolvent. 27 The Court
further implemented this growing doctrine by holding that the is-
sue of perfection is, in the final analysis, a federal question."'
In Illinois ex rel Gordon v. Campbell" the Court reviewed and
enumerated the elements which previous decisions had considered
necessary to perfect a state lien. These were: (1) certainty of the
identity of the lienor; (2) certainty as to the amount of the lien;
(3) specific property attached by the lien, and (4) title to or posses-
sion of the affected property.2 0 A lien deficient in any of these at-
tributes when the federal priority arose was considered merely "a
caveat of a more perfect lien to come."'1 Whether a sufficiently per-
fected state lien would in fact prevail over the federal priority is,
as yet, merely conjectural. Because all the state liens yet to come
before the Court have been found imperfct in some respect2 2 this
important question has been reserved for later treatment.
The doctrinal armour of section 3466, with its almost unattain-
able standards, appears to have been transferred to the section 3670
tax lien in United States v. Security Trust and Savings Bank.2 8
There a federal tax lien arose before a prior attaching creditor had
pursued his lien to judgment. The Court held that since perfection
of the creditor's lien was contingent on judgment, the federal lien
must prevail.
However a ray of hope was extended to state lienors in United
States v. New Britain,3 where the Court found that certain city tax
Kennedy, note 4 supra at 907.
Steps in this development were: Spokane County v. United States, 279 U. S. 80 (1929); New
York v. Maclay, 288 U. S. 290 (1933); and United States v. Texas, 314 U. S. 480 (1941).
"United States v. Waddill, Holland & Flinn, Inc., 323 U. S. 353 (1945). But cf. Spokane County
v. United States, 279 U. S. 80 (1929) (assumed the contrary).
m 329 U. S. 362, 375, 376 (1946).
" See United States v. Gilbert associates, Inc., 345 U. S. 361 (1953), where this last unique re-
quirement of possession defeated a city's prior and otherwise specific liens for taxes.
.1 New York v. Maclay, 288 U. S. 290, 294 (1933).
"E. g., United States v. Gilbert Associates, Inc., 345 U. S. 361 (1953).
"340 U. S. 47 (1950).
"347 U. S. 81 (1954).
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and water rent liens sufficiently met the standards of identity, cer-
tainty of amount and specificity of the property attached to defeat
a subsequently arising federal tax lien under the common law rule
of "first in time is first in right." In this case, as in all others in-
volving unforeclosed liens, the city had neither title nor possession
of the property to which its lien had attached. The Court's disre-
gard of what had been a fatal defect in cases concerning the section
3466 priority 3 suggested a difference in application of the doctrine
to the section 3670 lien.
6
Unfortunately, the bright ray extended by New Britain seems
to have been extinguished by United States v. White Bear Brewing
Co.,y7 where a mechanics' lien was recorded and in the process of
enforcement before the federal lien arose, but the federal lien was
recorded before judgmnt foreclosing the mechanics' lien was en-
tered. The Supreme Court, without opinion, reversed the Seventh
Circuit which had held for the mechanics' lienor. Since the White
Bear Brewing Co. lien appeared to meet the New Britain require-
ments, the logical inference is to mark New Britain as a departure
from, and White Bear Brewing Co. as a return to, application of the
section 3466 doctrine of perfection to the section 3670 lien."
The unsoundness of this result was pointed out by Judge Fin-
negan in his opinion for the Seventh Circuit in White Bear Brewing
Co.39 He noted that since the United States is a government of dele-
gated powers, it enjoys no sovereign prerogative of priority of pay-
ment. In the absence of federal common law, whatever priority the
United States claims must exist by virtue of statute. 40 To Judge
Finnegan, the absence of a priority provision in section 3670 indi-
cated Congress' intention not to render the federal tax lien absolute.
He might have further observed that, although section 3670 refers
simply to "a lien" for unpaid taxes, only a tortured reading can con-
strue "a lien" to mean what the United States Supreme Court has
attributed to the section 3670 tax lien.
If this judicial legislation is what the Colorado court protested
in the Vorreiter case, its exasperation is reasonable. If, however,
the Colorado court protested the secret floating lien which unfairly
deprives a creditor of his just debt, without notice or compensation,
the question becomes one of due process, which should have been
raised and decided. 4 1 Perhaps a more satisfactory solution would be
Congressional action requiring fair notice of the federal tax lien, or,
as has been suggested, 2 a system of priorities similar to that in the
Bankruptcy Act.
Compare New Britain with United States v. Gilbert Associates, Inc., 345 U. S. 361 (1953). The
facts appear indistinguishable, although the cases were distinguished.
W Kennedy, note 4 supra at 929-30.
= 227 F.2d 359 (7th Cir. 1955), rerv'd per curiam, 350 U. 5. 1010, rehearing denied, 351 U. S. 958
(1956).
See Mr. Justice Douglas's dissent in United States v. White Bear Brewing Co., 350 U. S. 1010
(1956).
Se United States v. White Bear Brewing Co., 227 F.2d 359 (7th Cir. 1955).
Quoting Mr. Justice Story in United States v. State Bank, 31 U. S. (6 Pet.) 29, 35 (1832).
41 Although due process was briefly mentioned in Chief Justice Moore's concurring opinion (307
P.2d at 479), a discussion of this point was conspicuously absent from the majority opinion.
42 Kennedy, note 4 supra at 930.
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